Mailvox: logic vs overactive imaginations

Rex Little is incredulous:

Most “rape” and “abuse” of women in the United States is completely fictitious.

MOST?? What do you base that on, Vox? Seems to me if false accusations were so common that they outnumbered real rapes, they wouldn’t make the news.

I like to start with an informative little document that the FBI likes to call the 2004 Uniform Crime Report.

Forcible Rapes Reported: 94,635
Forcible Rapes Cleared: 39,557 (it basically means arrested)

Murders Reported: 16,137
Murders Cleared: 10,101

So, percentage-wise, one-third more murderers were arrested despite the fact that there is, obviously, no victim around to help identify the murderer and the likelihood of DNA evidence is lower. Furthermore, excluded from the report counts are the “unfounded” reports, which for forcible rape was four times higher (8 percent) than the average for all Crime Index crimes (2 percent.) This means that the actual percentage arrested is only 38.7 percent, so already we’re dealing with a minority of the rapes reported resulting in arrest and we’re not even to the conviction rate yet.

According to the US Department of Justice, 48 percent of those arrested are convicted, so 18.6 percent of reported rapes are deemed genuine by the justice system. However, the USA conviction rate is extraordinarily high compared with every other country in the world, for example, in England, (which is also on the high side), only 5.6 percent of reported rapes result in convictions. That number has been plunging, down from 32 percent in 1977, possibly due to the introduction of DNA evidence making false accusations more difficult in countries where corroborative evidence is required, unlike in the United States where it is only necessary that a jury take a woman’s word for it.

Now, it is possible to simply assume that there are millions of rapes going unreported, but it is equally valid to assert that those millions of rapes are being committed by rainbow-tailed unicorns. For those who prefer logic and evidence to emotion and imagination, all of the available evidence around the world points the vast majority of rape reports being false.

Finally, note that all of this relates only to “forcible rape”. The FBI doesn’t track “statutory rape” or other sexual offenses, many of which your average rape hysterist likely considers to be rape, near-rape, unicorn rape, whatever. What little evidence I have seen suggests that the false report rates are higher and the arrest and conviction rates are lower than the forcible rape statistics.

A frightening near-rape experience

I know I’m shocked:

A 23-year-old Central Florida woman has been charged with making false statements about a rape that left Rollins College students scared to walk the campus, according to WKMG-TV in Orlando. In November, Desiree Nall told Winter Park police that she was raped by two men in a Rollins College bathroom.

“The college was on high alert and the neighborhood was in confusion because there was a lot of fear,” Winter Park police spokesman Wayne Farrell said. Investigators told WKMG-TV that Nall confessed to making up the story.

Nall is the president of the Brevard Chapter of the National Organization for Women, Local 6 News reported. Police said she may have been trying to make a statement when she lied about the rape.

How is that possible? We have been assured by feminist leaders that women – especially educated feminist women – never lie about these things. Obviously she must have suffered a “near-rape” experience like Amandagon’s poor friend and was misunderstood by the authorities when she reported her harrowing ordeal.

“Lying about that story is absolutely horrible because women are victimized every day.,” Rollins student Elizabeth Humphrey said. “And if we get the reputation of lying, then people won’t start to believe us if it does happen.”

Won’t start? What is she talking about? Most “rape” and “abuse” of women in the United States is completely fictitious. If you want to see real rape and abuse, go to Bosnia or the Sudan, which is where we are headed if the feminists are allowed to take Western culture down with their suicidal ideology. Women don’t fare so well under the law of tooth and claw, which is the primary long-term alternative to the Judeo-Christian tradition.

“Oh, it was awful, he hit me?” So what, are you a china doll? Did you break? And if so, then how is it possible that you’re still here, yapping away?

Mailvox: airpower and techno-ecumenicism

Major CC continues the discussion:

As a third-generation professional Airman, I could not let your statement that “the history of strategic bombing is a history of complete failure” go unanswered. Additionally, your assertion that Airpower, while being “a crucial tactical element… is strategically toothless” could not be more wrong. I’ve read many of the responses posted on your website, many driven by some pretty strong emotion-driven bias and selective statistics on every side of the debate, so I hope to try a more “strategic” approach, although I may seem overly optimistic to some.

First Lesson: Weapons are not inherently tactical, operational or strategic in and of themselves.

Whether a mission is tactical, operational, or strategic is dictated by the target and the effect of destroying or degrading that target, and not by the weapon used. The rifle and solitary bullet used by an army sniper can have a tactical, operational, or strategic effect, based on whether the target is an enemy platoon leader, commanding General, or Prime Minister. In the same way, a 2000 pound GPS-guided bomb dropped from the wild blue can have a tactical, operational, or strategic effect, based on whether the target is a tank, a command bunker, or a key communications node.

Agreed. I thought it was fairly clear that the aspect of airpower I was dismissing was the Dohout/Mitchell view of Airpower uber alles, that favored view of bloodless war-enamored political columnists, which believes that mass bombing campaigns and pinpoint air strikes are capable of winning wars without risking the infantry. The target of my criticism is not the Air Force, but those who call for its misuse under misapprehensions of its capabilities.

I understand the confusion. My father served in a Cold War Air Force that systemically confused the word strategic with nuclear bombers and the word tactical with conventional fighters. Vietnam left the Air Force totally confused over its role in a non-nuclear strategic air campaign, and we actually adopted the Army’s myopic AirLand Battle Doctrine in the late 70s and 80s, so I wouldn’t necessarily consider “flyboys” or “grunts” who served even 5-15 years ago to be experts on this topic, either.

I hope some of the retired flyboys who are reading this will note that the major said that, not me….

While AirLand Battle Doctrine did help give us the venerable A-10, it looked at conventional Airpower in terms of tactical Close Air Support or long-range artillery based on a mystical epic future tank battle in the Fulda Gap. While you seem to agree with the idea that employing ground forces, with airplanes buzzing in tactical submission overhead, is the only truly effective way to achieve strategic results, let me point out that two-dimensional conventional ground forces must first maneuver against the two-dimensional tactical targets on the ground in front of them. Only when they are able to push back or break through the “front line” can they begin to slog their way overland to operational and strategic targets.

The early airpower theorists recognized that Airpower could operate simultaneously against tactical, operational, and strategic target sets and attack from any direction at any time (sometimes referred to as “parallel warfare”). This time factor actually adds a fourth-dimensional advantage to air assets that ground forces simply do not possess. It has taken time for the technology to catch up with the theory. Just wait until we start employing airborne lasers, which will have the capability to vaporize an Iranian ballistic missile in flight and then refocus to deep-tan Usama from 20 miles away without even scorching his brokeback buddies’ Al-Qaeda-regulation beards.

Being a science fiction writer, I’m entirely open to the possibilities, indeed, one of my short stories anticipated something very similar to today’s Predator, albeit one used in a more networked capacity than anything today. However, the major must admit that “just wait” has been the mantra of the Air Force for over sixty years now. And while it has done many impressive things, it has seldom delivered the results it promised beforehand.

I’m not surprised when a civilian with a government school education thinks that war is only about “boots on the ground” with soldiers fighting hand-to-hand and door-to-door until we plant our flag on foreign soil. Any midgrade officer in today’s military should be able to explain that war, in a broader sense, is the application of various national instruments of power, including military, to make an enemy do what we want them to do (or kill them if they won’t). Our “national will” must be translated by civilian leaders into military objectives before military planners can determine how Airpower, or any other military capability, can be used to meet those objectives.

When have I ever stated anything about that? Indeed, I have written for the last two years about how “boots on the ground” will not suffice to accomplish our revised goals in Iraq. My skepticism with regards to Iran is not because I am setting up a strawman and arguing that air strikes won’t cause the mullahs to surrender – although Michael Ledeen did seem to think for a while that the mere threat of air strikes and special forces in support of Iranian insurrectionists would suffice a while back – it is because I doubt that a combination of air strikes and special forces ops are capable of shutting down a clandestine and distributed nuclear program run by smart people who watched what happened in Iraq. As Blackfive has mentioned, in war, the enemy gets a vote too.

With that in mind, our senior military leaders of all services must focus on meeting strategic objectives and the desired effects, rather than focusing on tactics and specific weapons. Contrary to your assertions, Airpower is actually most effective when used strategically, and is currently the most efficient means of achieving the quickest strategic effects with the least risk and cost – a bargain for the taxpayer, despite all the editorial comments regarding the cost of stealth-bombers, etc.

This is a naked assertion. I’d like to see some detailed evidence before I even consider conceding the point. Keep in mind, I have a whole catalog of information demonstrating how air power failed to even meet its stated strategic goals, much less proved to be more effective strategically than tactically.

Regardless of the Combined Bomber Offensive’s effect during WWII, the entire paradigm has changed. It has even changed exponentially since Operation DESERT STORM. The original Airpower theorists were way ahead of the technology, but it’s not really even about Airpower, but tactical, operational and strategic effects. It is true that 16 years after DESERT STORM, a single B-2 can launch from 3000 miles away, appear unannounced and unseen miles over enemy territory, destroy more than 60 targets on a single pass, at night, in bad weather, and depart without a trace, leaving behind a steel hailstorm precise enough to destroy diverse strategic, operational, and/or tactical targets simultaneously without even shattering the windows of adjacent buildings. More importantly, this B-2 can be data-linked with F-22 fighters or Navy radar cruisers, networked into US military data systems, retasked at a moment’s notice to fill priorities from a commander on the other side of the globe, coordinate operations with Army, Marine Corps, or Special Operations assets on the ground, receive updated and real-time intelligence from multiple sources, including drones, satellites, and intelligence sources, and share it’s own real-time situational information with everyone else. Obviously, the entire US military network is key to this process.

Trying to simplify the argument to “Air campaign” versus “Boots on the Ground” is old-school and based on ignorance of modern capabilities. US Military personnel now have the capability to operate across the spectrum of military operations, including Cyberspace, to destroy strategic, operational, and tactical targets as necessary to fulfill a combatant commanders objectives. Any Airman, Soldier, Sailor, or Marine who thinks only in terms of their Service’s capabilities has probably not been deployed recently and the mainstream media is too confused to understand what’s really going on (or has a political agenda of their own). In this vein, denying the strategic value of Airpower is based on ignorance or emotional bias.

I think the major has forgotten that I not only commit the occasional crime of science fiction, but I’m also a game designer. The capabilities of current cross-service networking haven’t even caught up with what I’ve envisioned in the near term, much less some of the concepts designed into the never released Rebel Moon Revolution… which had several military advisors, albeit mostly from the Marines. What holds true of the average journalism major now engaged in punditry seldom applies to me.

I do not deny that there may well be strategic value to airpower, I merely insist that it is toothless acting alone as numerous columnists have advocated. While the major’s holistic and techno-ecumenical approach does not explicitly admit to this stand-alone toothlessness, it could logically be seen as a tacit admission of sorts.

The question now is “what is the objective and what military effect do we need accomplished, and how fast”. Fortunately, Joint force commanders, not arm-chair bloggers, will decide how to meet that objective and what weapons systems to use, based on what’s available to them at any given time. Don’t be surprised if Air assets continue to operate strategically and decisively, from time to time.

I’ve tried to decipher the specific military objectives you and the other bloggers think would drive a war against Iran. When you comment that “precision air strikes launched in combination with special forces operating inside Iran… is only likely to succeed in Hollywood”, what objectives are you using to measure success? Degradation of Iran’s Military or Nuclear Capability? You allude to a possible invasion of Iran – to what end? Regime Change? Unconditional Surrender? If you let me know exactly what you think the objectives of a military action against Iran might be, we can begin to discuss which ones an Air Campaign could and could not achieve.

Keep up the great discussions! The truth always comes out eventually.

With regards to airstrikes (plus special forces), the public objective would be preventing Iran from obtaining a working nuclear-tipped missile. As I’ve already said, I am skeptical that this can be prevented regardless of what we do, short of the use of nuclear weapons or a massive boots-on-the-ground invasion. The quiet objective I suspect would be preventing the opening of the Iran Oil Bourse, or at least preventing oil being sold in Euros. This could theoretically be accomplished without violence, or merely with its threat. (That’s what I assume is going on.) An invasion would be meant to cause regime change, and presumably, the installation of a government in accordance with the principles of the world democratic revolutionaries.

A little late there, Mr. Buckley

Mr. Buckley finally admits to the limits of military power:

Three years ago (March 2003) I wrote in this space: “What Mr. Bush proposes to do is to unseat Saddam Hussein and to eliminate his investments in aggressive weaponry. We can devoutly hope that internecine tribal antagonisms will be subsumed in the fresh air of a despot removed, and that the restoration of freedom will be productive. But these concomitant developments can’t be either foreseen by the United States or implemented by us. What Mr. Bush can accomplish is the removal of a regime and its infrastructure. The Iraqi people will have to take it from there.”

Mr. Bush is entitled to maintain, doggedly and persuasively, that he took the right steps — up through the overthrow of Saddam and the exposure of an armory without weapons of mass destruction. From that point on, the challenge required more than his deployable resources. His political reputation will rest on his success in making that point and ceding realistically to realities we are not going to cope with, and ought not to attempt to cope with.

Mr. Buckley, appears to be attempting to cover up for the fact that he did not, as I and a very few other writers did, oppose the madness of “nation-building”. It was a foolish notion from the start as there was never any nation to be built, there were at least three separate nations all subject to the same repressive force. Keeping them together required the same sort of repression that was seen in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, as we are finally beginning to recognize some three years later.

I was willing to support an open and declared war on Iraq and other self-declared enemies of America as a means of ending this clash of civilizations that began in the 1970s – or 1950s if you view the post-independence violence that took place in India as the rebirth of jihad. War is the health of the state, true, but unlike the tango, it does not require two. However, it has become clear that the neoconservative utopians in the administration do not see this undeclared and unconstitutional war as a reactive strike in self-defense, but more as a means of reshaping the global order. I expect this attempt to work about as well as Woodrow Wilson’s did in 1918. February 2004

I was pleased to note, however, that Mr. Buckley did make reference to the WWII occupations, which I openly mocked back when they were being made as a means of attempting to rationalize the post-war violence.

The conquest of Iraq no more brought about an end to the global jihad than did the conquest of the Rhineland-Palatinate mean the end of World War II. Nor could it have. Berlin had to fall before the defeat of Nazi Germany could even be contemplated, and it’s bizarre to suggest that the occupation of a peripheral Arabic province could end the war while the Clausewitzian center of gravity remains unmolested.April 2004

On a related, note, I found the Littlest Chickenhawk’s explanation of how he and other clever pundits derive their political positions to be more than a little telling:

Clever politicians and pundits, therefore, try to find a way of hedging their bets…. It is worthwhile arguing about strategy in Iraq and in the global war on terror. But honest strategic suggestions can be — and must be — distinguished from simple political positioning.

It appears that we can conclude from this that Mr. B. Shapiro, Esquire, will cease his crowing for imperial conquest now that empire has been declared to be officially declasse by the Confather. Look for future apologetics explaining how it is the fault of insufficiently martial Americans, most of them Democrats, that Sunni Iraqis and Shia Iraqis prefer killing each other in genuine power struggles to participating in farcical elections wherein a bi-factional elite pretends to pay attention to the Will of the People while ignoring it whenever it suits them.